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Are Sentient Beings Replaceable?
 
By "sentient beings", I mean crea­
tures that are sentient or conscious, 
but not rational and self-conscious. 
They are not persons in the Lockean 
sense who can reason and see them­
selves as beings with a past and a 
futu reo 
This classification of beings is 
intended to be non-speciesist: species 
is irrelevant as far as membership in 
the class of sentient beings is con­
cerned. Animals such as chickens are 
sentient beings, and so are humans 
such as fetuses, new-born infants, 
and defective adults. Perhaps there 
are animals such as chimpanzees who 
are persons and not sentient beings. 
A cu rrently fashionable view is 
that sentient beings are replaceable. 1 
On this view, there is nothing wrong 
with painlessly killing a happy sen­
tient being provided it is replaced 
with another such being. My main 
target in this paper is this replace­
ment view, particularly as it is 
defended by Peter. Singer. I begin 
with a consideration of the replace­
ability argument that Singer uses to 
defend his view. Then I claim that 
Singer has an objectionable receptacle 
view of sentient beings. Finally, I 
argue that replacement does not make 
killing a sentient being morally per­
missible. 
To begin with, let us consider 
Singer's "replaceability argument." 
This argument is initially stated as a 
limited defense of rearing· animals for 
food. But more is at stak~ than just 
meat-eating: Singer goes on to give 
the argument as a defense of human 
abortion and infanticide. Here is the 
argument: 
Although meat-eaters are 
responsible for the death of 
the animal they eat and for the 
loss of pleasure experienced by 
that animal, they are also 
responsible for the creation of 
more animals, since if no one 
ate meat there would be no 
more animals bred for fatten­
ing. The loss meat-eaters 
inflict on one animal is thus 
balanced, on the total view, by 
the benefit they confer on the 
next. We may call this 'the 
replaceability argument'. 2 
Now Singer is generally opposed to 
meat-eating on utilitarian grounds: it 
wastes resou rces and it produces pain 
and suffering for animals. In line 
with this general attack, he proceeds 
to make two points which he claims 
weaken the replaceability argument as 
a defense of meat-eating. The first is 
that it would not justify eating the 
flesh of animals reared in factory 
farms because their lives are to them­
selves more of a bu rden than a ben­
efit. This point is well-taken. But 
the argument can still be used to jus­
tify eating the flesh of happy animals. 
Singer himself admits that if chickens 
can be killed painlessly, and for eco­
nomic reasons they could not be 
reared if we did not eat them, then 
"the replaceability argument will jus­
tify killing the birds, because depriv­
ing them of the pleasures of their 
existence can be offset against the 
pleasu res of chickens who do not yet 
exist, and will exist only if existing 
chickens are killed. "3 
Singer's second point about the 
argument is as follows: 
A second point is that if it is 
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good to create life, then pre­
sumably it is good for thei r to 
be as many people on ou r 
planet as it can possibly hold. 
With the' possible exception of 
arid areas suitable only for 
pasture, the surface of our 
globe can support more people 
if we grow plant foods than if 
we raise animals." 
This point is questionable. Why is 
it good to create life? This doesn't 
follow from the replaceability argument 
or from the total view version of utili­
tarianism assumed in the argument. 
And why is it good for thei r to be as 
many people as possible? Th is doesn't 
follow either; in fact, it seems 
unlikely that having as many people 
as possible will produce the greatest 
quantity of pleasure. Finally, even 
granting Singer's assumptions, it does 
not follow that the best way to sup­
port more people is by growing plant 
food rather than animals. Increased 
production of certain animals 
might possibly be the best 
support more people. 
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II 
Thus far the replaceability argu­
ment remains undefeated as a limited 
defense of meat-eating. In this sec­
tion, I want to raise some more fun­
damental objections. 
Are sentient beings really replace­
able? That is the main issue. Singer 
recognizes this, for he goes on to cite 
a persuasive objection given by Hen ry 
Salt, the nineteenth-century English 
vegetarian. According to Salt, the 
fallacy of the argument is that it com­
pares existence with non-existence, 
and this is nonsense .. The happiness 
of a being who exists cannot be sen­
sibly compared to the happiness of a 
non-existent being. 
Singer notes that when he wrote 
Animal Liberation he accepted Sa It' s 
view. But now he is less confident. 
What bothers him is our intuitions 
about bringing beings into existence: 
if we think it bad knowingly to bring 
a miserable being into existence, then 
why don't we think it good knowingly 
to bring a happy being into existence? 
On the total view which Singer 
accepts, it seems that it would be 
good to bring happy beings into exis­
tence, since that is one way to pro­
duce a greater total· of pleasure. So 
on this view, the happiness of non­
existent beings can and should be 
considered, and compared to the hap­
piness of existing beings. 
Singer is not very confident about 
this appeal to vague intuitions. So he 
tries to reply to Salt's objection in a 
different way. His reply depends on 
dividing beings into two groups: sen­
tient beings and persons. Persons 
are rational and self-conscious beings, 
while sentient beings are merely con­
scious. Salt's view correctly applies 
to persons, Singer says, but it does 
not apply to mere sentient beings. 
But why not? Singer maintains that 
the existence or non-existence of a 
sentient being can be left out of the 
utilitarian calculation; all that needs 
to be considered is pleasu re or happi­
ness, both actual and possible, and 
their is nothing nonsensical about 
doing that. What do we say about the 
beings themselves then? Singer's 
answer is that they are mere contain­
ers of experiences, or "receptacles:" 
Beings that· are conscious, but 
not self-conscious, on the 
other hand, can properly be 
regarded as receptacles for 
experiences of pleasu re and 
pain, rather than as individu­
als leading lives of their own. 5 
But just how are sentient beings 
receptacles? Singer explains it in the 
following way: 
The total version of utilita rian­
ism regards sentient beings as 
valuable only in so far as they 
make possible the existence of 
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intrinsically valuable experi­
ences like pleasures. It is as 
if sentient beings are recepta­
cles of something valuable and 
it does not matter if a recepta­
cle gets broken, so long as 
thei r is another receptacle to 
which the contents can be 
transferred without any getting 
spilt. 6 
This receptacle view involves a 
strange view of experiences and sub­
jects of experiences. It tal ks about 
experience being "transferred" to a 
different subject Ii ke water being 
pou red from one glass to another. 
This is nonsense on the face of it. 
On our ordinary conception, experi­
ences necessarily belong to the sub­
ject who has them--my p'ain is mine 
and not somebody else's, and it does 
not make sense to say that my pain 
can be "transferred" to another sub­
ject. As for subjects of experience, 
it is very odd to say that they are 
mere "receptacles" of experience, as if 
they had no awa reness of them. 
Singer's adoption of this view gives 
him another problem. He does not 
want to apply it to persons, but why 
not? Why aren't persons just recep­
tacles of experience that happen to 
hold more. "contents" than sentient 
beings? On preference utilitarianism, 
the version of utilitarianism that 
Singer applies to persons, the inter­
ests of persons are taken into 
account. But this sort of utilitarian­
ism seems to treat persons as mere 
receptacles of intrinsically valuable 
satisfied interests just as the total 
view treats sentient beings as recep­
tacles of intrinsically valuable pleas­
ures. The trouble is that once utili­
tarianism has picked out certain 
things as intrinsically valuable, the 
subjects who have them or "contain" 
them become morally insignificant; 
they are mere means rather than ends 
in themselves. The classical remedy 
to this neglect of subjects, of course, 
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is to insist that they are ends in 
themselves having an intrinsic value 
apart from their experiences. 
In any event, Singer has not given 
a satisfactory reply to Salt's objection 
about comparing existence with non­
existence. The appeal to vague intui­
tions about bringing beings into exis­
tence is not very convincing, as 
Singer admits. And the objectionable 
receptacle view, once adopted, seems 
to apply to persons as well as sentient 
beings; this· produces the unhappy 
result that the replaceability argument 
applies to persons as well as sentient 
beings. 
III 
In the last section, I objected to 
Singer's receptacle view of sentient 
beings. It turns out that Singer has 
another way of making the distinction 
between persons and sentient beings, 
namely what he calls "the test of uni­
versalizability': " 
The test of universalizability 
supports this view [the recep­
tacle vieW]. If I. imagine 
myself in tu rn as a self-con­
scious being and a conscious 
but not self-conscious being, it 
is on Iy in the former case that 
I could have a desire to live in 
addition to a desire for pleasu­
rable· experiences. Hence it is 
only in the former case that 
my death is not adequately 
compensated for by the cre­
ation of a being with similar 
prospects of pleasu rable expe­
riences. 7 
From this it looks like the desire to 
live is what marks the morally signifi­
cant dividing line between persons 
and sentient beings, and not rational­
ity and self-consciousness. For the 
sake of clarity, let me reformulate the 
argument contained in this passage, 
using "sentient being" to mean "con­
scious but not self-conscious being," 
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and "similar replacement being" to 
mean "being with similar prospects of 
pleasurable experiences;" 
(1) A sentient being does not 
have a desire to live. 
(2) If a sentient being does not 
have a desire to live, then its death 
is adequately compensated for by the 
creation of a similar replacement 
being. 
(3) Hence its death is adequately 
compensated for by the creation of a 
similar replacement being. 
The truth of premiss (1) depends 
on the meaning of "a desire to live." 
If this means an unconscious urge to 
stay alive, then it seems possible that 
sentient beings do have such a 
desire. On the other hand, if this 
means a conscious preference to live 
in the futu re, then only persons can 
have this desire. Still it should be 
noted that plenty of persons do not 
have a conscious desire to live in the 
future. Would it be wrong painlessly 
to kill such a person? Suppose doing 
this does not violate any conscious 
preference. And it produces good 
side effects for others. The person 
killed can also be replaced by another 
and happier person. It looks Ii ke the 
replaceability argument could be used 
to justify painlessly killing such a 
person. Or at least Singer does not 
rule this out. 
Premiss (2) also needs to be inter­
preted. What does Singer mean by 
"adequate compensation?" Obviously 
it is not compensation in the form of a 
benefit to someone wronged, for the 
sentient being killed receives no such 
benefit. Singer's examples make it 
clear enough that what he has in mind 
is a sort of impersonal compensation in 
the form of a moral balance where the 
loss of good is balance by a gain of 
good. Thus when he discusses 
replacing chickens for food, he says 
that the loss of pleasure resulting 
from killing the chickens is offset by 
the gain in pleasu re produced by the 
creation of new chickens. 8 Similarly, 
he claims that the loss of happiness 
produced by killing a fetus or an 
infant is offset by the gain of happi­
ness resulting from the birth of a 
similar fetus or infant. 
Consider one of Singer's examples, 
a case of abortion for convenience: 
Suppose a woman has been 
planning to join a mountain­
climbing expedition in June, 
and in January she learns that 
she is two months pregnant. 
She has no children pres­at· 
. ent, and firmly intends to have 
a child within a year. The 
pregnancy is unwanted only 
because it is inconveniently 
timed. Opponents of abortion 
would presumably think an 
abortion in these circumstances 
particularly outrageous, for 
neither the life nor the health 
of the mother is at stake--only 
the enjoyment she gets from 
climbing mountains. Yet if 
abortion is wrong only because 
it deprives the world of a 
futu re person / this abortion is 
not wrong; it does no more 
than delay the entry of a per­
son into the wo rid. 9 
In this example, replacement does 
not merely provide a moral balance of 
the sort we have been discussing, it 
also makes killing a sentient being not 
wrong; it makes this morally permitted 
even for the sake of convenience. 
But is this abortion not wrong as 
Singer says? It is not very plausible 
to say that it is wrong only because it 
deprives the world of a futu re per­
son/ as if no one is killed. Even at 
two months, the fetus has a brain and 
can feel pain and pleasure. Isn't 
killing this fetus deliberately and 
painfully wrong? Certainly it is 
wrong from a hon-utilitarian view­
point: it is wrong intentionally and 
painfully to kill an innocent human 
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being merely for the sake of conven­-
ience. 
But is it wrong according to the 
total view, the version of 
utilitarianism that Singer applies to 
sentient beings? The answer is not 
so obvious. We have to estimate the 
good and bad effects of the abortion, 
and try to determine if the abortion 
produces a greater quantity of pleas­-
ure than the alternative of not getting 
an abortion. Suppose that the loss of 
pleasu re resulting form the death of 
one fetus is exactly balanced by a 
gain in pleasure produced by the cre­-
ation . of another fetus when the 
mother gets pregnant again. Presum­-
ably, this is what Singer has in mind. 
It doesn't follow from this that the 
abortion is not wrong. The alterna­-
tive of not getting' an abortion would 
not produce this loss of pleasure. 
Why isn't this morally better? Also 
the abortion itself produces pain for 
the fetus and the mother, while the 
alternative does not do this. Fu r­-
thermore, there a re side effects on 
the mother and others to be consid­-
ered. Surely the abortion will pro­-
duce· bad effects on the mother such 
as guilt, anxiety about getting preg­-
nant again, and so on. What about 
the husband, assuming there is one? 
Wouldn't there be bad effects on him, 
particularly if he wanted the first 
child? Perhaps there will also be bad 
effects on the doctors and nurses too; 
perhaps relatives will be affected. All 
these bad effects have to be weighed 
against the good effect on the mother: 
she gets to enjoy her climbing trip. 
All things considered, it seems likely 
that the bad effects of the abortion 
outweigh the good effects, .and that 
the alternative of not getting an abor-
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tion is morally pr·cfer·able. If so, the 
abortion is wrong, even accor'ding to 
the total view accepted by Singer. 
To conclude: Singer has not shown 
that replacement provides adequate 
compensation for painfully killing a 
sentient being in the sense of making 
it not wrong. 10 
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